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Article

COMMENTARY: A LAW PROFESSOR'S
SUGGESTIONS FOR ESTATE AND TRUST REFORM
ROBERT WHiTMAN

Within a short time, trusts and the trust community will enter
the 21st century. In that century, what changes in the trust industry are we to expect? Should we expect a greater emphasis by trustees, and those who serve them, on acting primarily in the public's
interest?
In the latter part of the 20th century, trusts have become big
business. There has been some tendency for corporate fiduciaries to
view trusts merely as profit centers, opportunities to expand into
new areas of profit generation. Perhaps it has been the lack of opportunity for communication among members of the trust community that has allowed the search for increased profits to overshadow
the absolute need for the trust industry to properly serve the pub. Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. Professor
Whitman is founder and Chair of the Law Professor Advisory Group For
Trusts and Estates (a group of twenty-six law professors). The group is
pledged to serve the trusts and estates community giving particular attention
to the public's interest and the rights of beneficiaries.
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lic's interests. It is unlikely that we will ever see a return to the
flagrant use of the trust system to dispense political patronage and
enrich fiduciaries at the expense of beneficiaries. However, it is not
enough that trust administration has merely improved somewhat.
Only by aggressive planning by the trust industry and by emphasizing excellent service can trusts be expected to remain vital and
survive.
Fortunately, in recent years consumer organizations devoted to
protecting the interests of trust beneficiaries and helping them assert their rights, have come on the scene. These organizations
have, sometimes painfully, reminded the trust industry of the full
extent of its obligations to the public it serves. Unfortunately, because of lack of communication between all interested groups, there
has been to date more court clashes than working conferences,
more anger than understanding.
In an effort to organize properly for needed reforms, twenty-six
law professors have formed a new organization, The Law Professor
Advisory Group For Trusts and Estates (The Group). Rejecting litigation as an appropriate avenue for conflict resolution, The Group
has made its services available to all members of the trust community. To date, it has served as an advisor to HEIRS, Inc. and to several corporate fiduciaries. In a number of situations The Group has
been successful in diffusing anger and mistrust by working with
the parties to reach mutually agreeable solutions to the issues at
hand.
The materials presented below represent a sample of The
Group's work product. In January, 1998, The Group will hold a conference to which all members of the trust community have been invited. It is hoped that all major groups will participate in the conference and new and creative solutions to common problems of the
trust industry will be worked on then and regularly thereafter on
into the next century.
I. SHOULD WILL BENEFICIARIES HAVE GREATER
CONTROL OVER CHOICE OF EXECUTOR?
Recently, several informal surveys were conducted to gauge interest in the following proposal (The Proposal):
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A. The Proposal
Without the need to show cause, a court having jurisdiction may
appoint as the personal representative of a will the nominee of the
beneficiaries of the will in the following circumstance: The deceased testator leaves a valid will. She names X as personal representative and under the will the entire estate is to be distributed
outright to an individual, or a group of individuals, all of whom
have capacity. All beneficiaries are in agreement that they wish a
different personal representative to serve. The beneficiaries have
informed the court of their unanimous decision. The court finds no
compelling circumstances requiring an appointment of a personal
representative other than the one unanimously wanted by the
beneficiaries.
B. Comment
While ordinarily it is the testator's intent with regard to the appointment of the personal representative that is to be respected,
where the testator has given the entire estate to one or more capable beneficiaries, unless there are special circumstances the beneficiaries preferences for a personal representative should prevail.
This rule recognizes that after the will is drawn, circumstances
unforeseen by the testator, may make the original choice of personal representative undesirable to the beneficiaries. The law
should recognize that, where all the beneficiaries are in agreement
as to the person they wish to have in charge of administration, potential costly conflicts between the beneficiaries and the personal
representative can be avoided by allowing the beneficiaries to
choose the personal representative they want. The rule recognizes
the possibility that the testator may not have understood the full
implications of her choice of personal representative.
In addition, especially when time has elapsed from the date the
will is drawn to the testator's death, circumstances may have
changed dramatically. A favored local corporate fiduciary may have
merged with a larger out-of-state bank unfamiliar to the testator
and her beneficiaries. Minor beneficiaries may have grown-up; individuals named to serve may have moved away, retired, had a
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dramatic change of personal circumstances, or lost full capacity.
Nonetheless, the court is not to appoint as executor of the will
the choice of the beneficiaries if the court finds that such appointment would not be in the best interests of the beneficiaries.
There is to be a rebuttable presumption, particularly applicable
when the will was executed prior to the enactment of this section,
that if the testator at the time of making her will had been asked if
she would want the personal representative to be the person
wanted by all the capable beneficiaries, the testator would have
chosen the result provided above. Furthermore, where the testator
specifically indicates in the will an intent not to allow all of the
beneficiaries to override her designee, the court shall not grant the
request made by the beneficiaries.
C. The Surveys
Thus far three informal surveys have been conducted on the
merits of The Proposal.1 The first survey was taken among the
members of the Law Professor Advisory Group. The result was
heavily for The Proposal (four to one), with some strong dissent.
The second survey was taken among law students enrolled in Professor Whitman's Trust and Estates class in the fall of 1996. The
result was heavily in favor of The Proposal (four to one). The third
survey was conducted among the members of the State Laws
Committee of The American College of Trusts and Estates Counsel
(ACTEC) meeting in Palm Springs, California, in January, 1997.
The result was heavily against The Proposal (five to one) with
strong feeling that the law in this area should not change.
Among the concerns expressed by those against The Proposal
were: 1) that if a change were to be made, it must be only for wills
executed after the enactment of the new rule, 2) that testators
would simply always show a clear intent in the will not to have the
new rule take effect, 3) that some testators use the appointment to
reward a loyal professional (e.g., lawyer, accountant), 4) that the
use of an independent executor helps avoid fights among the bene1

A copy of the survey format is reproduced at the end of this article. All

readers are invited to respond to the survey.
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ficiaries, and 5) The Proposal would create uncertainty in an area
where certainty now exists.
II. PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS
2 FOR TRUST
BENEFICIARIES
A. OverridingPrinciple- TrustsAre Forthe Benefit of Beneficiaries
1. Trusts are created primarily to benefit beneficiaries. Under no
circumstances are fiduciaries (e.g., Trustees, and those who serve
them) to place their interests above the interests of the beneficiaries they serve. Fiduciaries, and those who serve them, are pledged
to put the interests of the beneficiaries above their own interests
and to concentrate on exclusively serving the public's need.
2. It is the trust industry's responsibility, as a group, to engage in
meaningful, coordinated reform efforts aimed at serving the public
interest and, particularly, the interests of trust beneficiaries.
3. It is the trust industry's responsibility, as a group, to understand and clarify that service as a trustee is not to be seen as simply a profit-maximizing activity, i.e., acting as a trustee is primarily a quasi-public service.
4. The trust industry, as a group, is responsible for organizing
coordinated efforts both to monitor and assess present practices
and, where appropriate, to make needed changes.
5. Steps need to be taken to create new law that provides, unless
At the request of HEIRS, Inc., The Law Professor Advisory Group For
Trust and Estates has drafted this proposed Bill of Rights For Trust Beneficiaries. A draft of a proposed Bill of Rights was originally drawn by Bob
Whitman, with the assistance of Professor Ronald Chester, of the New England Law School. The first public discussion of The Bill of Rights was at The
HEIRS, Inc. Conference, held at the Breakers Hotel, Palm Beach, Florida, on
January 3-4, 1997. HEIRS, Inc. is a consumer organization of trust beneficiaries seeking to work with the trust community to foster protection for trust
beneficiaries. As an initial step toward organizing needed reforms, HEIRS,
Inc. asked The Law Professor Advisory Group to draft the Bill of Rights. Anyone interested in commenting on The Bill of Rights should contact the Professor Whitman at University of Connecticut School of Law, 65 Elizabeth Street,
Hartford, CT 06510.
2
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clearly indicated to the contrary in a governing instrument, that
the presumption is that a settlor:
a. wants measures taken that will make trust administration
economical;
b. wants appropriate actions taken to meet changed circumstances;
c. has the needs of the beneficiaries uppermost in mind;
d. expects the trustee to be devoted exclusively to the interest of
the beneficiaries;
e. has no desire to reduce fiduciary responsibility and liability;
and
f. expects fees, and other expenses, to be reasonable and to be explained in detail.
6. A plan of action needs to be developed (hopefully by a joint effort on the part of HEIRS, INC. and the trust industry (and those
who serve it) in order to bring about:
a. an attitude of courtesy, concern, and caring by professionals in
the trust industry leading to more effective communication with,
and service to, beneficiaries so that they can fully understand
transactions being made for their benefit.
b. more of an opportunity for beneficiaries to have choices and to
be heard meaningfully;
c. summary procedures for terminating trusts and/or changing
trustees where this is called for in the best interest of the beneficiaries;
d. training of trust administration personnel, which is designed
to reduce attitudes inimical to the purposes of The Bill of Rights;
e. effective, uniform accounting procedures;
f. more uniform and effective procedures for resolving complaints
against fiduciaries in a fast and inexpensive manner;
g. provision for proper notice to all interested parties, including
notice of any applicable statute of limitations; and
h. the development and general use of alternative dispute resolu-
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tion systems.
7. Ethical codes of conduct concerning treatment of beneficiaries
need to be created for all professional groups involved with trusts.
8. A group to organize individual trustees needs to be created.
9. A collective organization should be created to study the possibility of changing legal rules to foster the elimination of the unnecessary use of trusts, or the simplification of their use in areas
where they do not help beneficiaries and/or society.
10. An ongoing interchange should be facilitated between all
groups representing beneficiaries, trustees, and advisors to trustees.
11. The obligation for implementing the above suggestions lies
first with the trustees and with those who serve their needs. Each
involved organization should take inventory regarding how it has
acted to help beneficiaries. Each organization should prepare a report detailing the work that it has done to insure the protection of
the rights of the beneficiaries. A long range plan for the future
must be developed and disseminated. The committees established
for this purpose, and their agendas should be reported on. Also, the
plan in place (or to be put in place) for directly involving beneficiaries in decision-making should be detailed.
12. An independent oversight committee should be promptly created to carry out the goals expressed in The Bill of Rights.
III. OFFERING TRUST BENEFICIARIES A LIMITED ROLE
IN INVESTMENT DECISIONMAKING
Increasingly, there has been vocal criticism by trust beneficiaries
concerning rising fees and falling rates of return achieved by corporate fiduciaries. This outcry has fueled a fire to allow portability
- the right of the beneficiaries to replace one corporate trustee with
another without the need to show cause.
Regardless of the merits and final outcome of the debate, giving
some choice regarding investment decisions to trust beneficiaries
could quiet present criticisms, reduce the need for financial analysts and bank staff and thereby, hopefully, permit reduction of
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ever-spiraling bank trust fees.
Consider corporate fiduciary X whose investments are being
made, in part, into mutual funds 1,2,3,4 or 5. Instead of the bank
alone deciding on appropriate allocations between these funds,
suppose the bank offered the beneficiaries of Trust A - collectively the right to agree unanimously on the allocations desired for some
part, or all, of the trust assets.
Under this arrangement, the participating trust beneficiaries are
empowered to share in creating their own futures. If their choices
produce extraordinary investment results, everyone is happy. If
their choices produce poor results, at least the corporate fiduciary
will not be blamed.
What now prevents corporate fiduciaries shifting in part to this
pattern of allowing beneficiaries to play this limited role in investment? First, the law would need to be changed to allow for the
delegation of some investment decision making power to the beneficiaries. Then, it would be made clear that if the creator of the
trust wants all investment decisions to be made solely by the corporate fiduciary, she can clearly say so.
Where beneficiaries would be allowed some limited say in investment, since the corporate fiduciary controls the choice of the
funds being dealt with, there is still assurance that high risk
speculation will be avoided. Furthermore, as additional protection,
the corporate fiduciary can offer beneficiaries investment choices
with regard to only a portion of trust assets.
The argument asserting that if individuals are free to make investment decisions regarding their 401K plans and IRAs, trust
beneficiaries should be given similar control over some investment
choices, seems persuasive. Only by constantly considering proposals for reforming trust administration will the practice of using
trusts remain viable.
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SURVEY FORM REGARDING CHOICE OF FIDUCIARY
YOUR CHANCE TO BE HEARD
To register your opinion regarding the reform proposal, please
fill out the following survey form:
SURVEY
Please indicate your view on the above.
Check One
1. I agree with the above proposal.
2. I disagree with the above proposal.
COMMENTS

Name of Person Responding & Position Held:
Date:

In order to take part in the survey, please fill out this page and
return it to Ms. Linda Kirk (Professor Whitman's Secretary). You
can respond to Ms. Kirk by mail at University of Connecticut
School of Law, 65 Elizabeth Street, Hartford, CT 06105, or by FAX
(860) 570-5242, or by e-mail at LKirk@Holmes.law.uconn.edu.

